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TOWARD EVIDENCE-BASED EVIDENCE:
SUPPORTING FORENSIC KNOWLEDGE CLAIMS IN
THE POST-DA UBERT ERA
Simon A. Cole*
As legal scholars begin to take stock of what we might call the "Daubert regime,"
the treatment of expert evidence in law in the period following the United States
Supreme Court's watershed decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. in
1993,1 one of the most persistent issues has been a perceived lack of rigor in the
application of Daubert's gate keeping requirement to forensic evidence. Scholars have
observed that, at least when it comes to civil law, Daubert and its progeny decisions did
not have the liberalizing effect on the admission of evidence that early readers of the
opinion thought it might.2  To the contrary, some scholars have described an
"exclusionary ethos" surrounding the Daubert regime. 3 Scholars who focus on criminal
law, however, have detected the opposite situation; they have decried the weakness with
which Daubert has been applied in criminal law, particularly in regard to forensic
evidence. 4  What accounts for this disparity? Professor Risinger's comparative
examination of outcomes of admissibility decisions across criminal and civil law is
disconcertingly consistent with what a legal realist would predict: Trial judges operating
under the Daubert regime are extremely unlikely to exclude expert evidence proffered by
the government in criminal cases, and in civil cases they are far more likely to exclude
expert evidence proffered by plaintiffs than by defendants.
5
Indeed, case law strongly supports the conclusion that the exclusion under the
* Associate Professor of Criminology, Law & Society, University of California, Irvine; Ph.D. (Science &
Technology Studies), Cornell University; A.B., Princeton University. This project was funded in part by the
National Science Foundation (Award #SES-0347305). Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or
recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of
the National Science Foundation. The author consulted, and in some cases testified or submitted affidavits, for
the defendants in the following cases that are discussed in this article: United States v. Mitchell, United States
v. Llera Plaza, Cole, and Rose.
1. 509 U.S. 579 (1993); Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner,
522 U.S. 136 (1997).
2. See generally Margaret A. Berger, What Has a Decade of Daubert Wrought? 95 Am. J. Pub. Health 59
(2005).
3. Gary Edmond & David Mercer, Daubert and the Exclusionary Ethos: The Convergence of Corporate
and Judicial Attitudes toward the Admissibility of Expert Evidence in Tort Litigation, 26 L. & Policy 231
(2004).
4. Paul Giannelli, Forensic Science, 34 J.L., Med. & Ethics 310, 310 (2006).
5. D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of Certainty Being Left on
the Dock? 64 Alb. L. Rev. 99 (2000).
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Daubert/Kumho standard for forensic evidence proffered by the government remains rare
indeed, despite some recent exclusions. 6  Moreover, the courts' "inclusionary ethos"
seems remarkably inconsistent with the trend of legal scholarship, which tends to evince
skepticism that many forensic techniques satisfy the requirements of Daubert and
Kumho. This pattern is particularly clear in regard to fingerprint evidence in which
numerous courts have found the evidence admissible, despite a body of legal literature
that overwhelmingly states the opposite. 7 In this article, I will suggest that one possible
explanation for these apparent disparities may be a lack of clarity about the nature and
purpose of the Daubert inquiry8 itself. I propose the metaphor "evidence-based
evidence," drawing on the culturally resonant prefix "evidence-based," as a way of
perhaps clarifying the goal that a Daubert inquiry seeks to achieve.
I. DAUBERTAND THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE
What is evidence? Evidence might be conceived as the building blocks that
contribute the law's edifice of proof Law is, at least in part, a truth-seeking institution,
and it is through the hearing and consideration of evidence that law purports to discover
truth. More than that, it is at least to some extent, only through evidence that proof may
be reached--or fact demonstrated-in law. In this sense, law is not different from other
disciplines that claim to be founded on reason, from science to journalism, that likewise
claim to rely largely or exclusively on evidence to arrive at factual statements and, more
broadly, truth itself.9
In trials, law evaluates the relative likelihood of competing factual claims by
examining and considering the evidence that supports those claims. By evaluating the
evidence legal fact-finders can purportedly make an evaluation as to which factual claim
appears more likely to be true. The process necessarily entails a regress, however. In
weighing the evidence supporting competing factual claims, a fact-finder might simply
assume that all evidence is equally trustworthy. Clearly, however, this is not necessarily
the case. Therefore, we must ask: How do we evaluate the relative truth of the
evidentiary claims themselves? There appear to be three broad approaches to this
problem. The first is that this weighing may be done by the fact-finder simultaneous to
the hearing of the evidence, as when a fact-finder is expected to evaluate the
trustworthiness of a witness based on demeanor, consistency of answers, ability to
withstand cross examination, and so on. The second is through rules, such as the rules of
evidence. Of course, it is not necessarily imagined that adherence to these rules always
increases the trustworthiness of evidence, but it is perhaps supposed that across the entire
6. See e.g. U.S. v. Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D. Mass. 2005).
7. David L. Faigman, Modern Scientific Evidnece: The Law and Science of Expert Testimony (3d ed.,
West 2007); Giannelli, supra n. 4, at 310.
8. In this article I use the term "Daubert inquiry," rather than "Daubert hearing" because, although the
Daubert opinion and its progeny mandate a gate keeping responsibility, they do not mandate that evidence
informing the gate keeping decision be gathered specifically via hearing. A court might presumably perform
an excellent "Daubert inquiry" by gathering information about the reliability about an item of evidence without
holding a hearing.
9. See generally Susan Haack, Defending Science-Within Reason: Between Scientism and Cynicism
(Prometheus Bks. 2003).
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universe of cases trustworthiness is enhanced. Alternately, such rules may not enhance
trustworthiness at all, but may serve other important legal principles.
A third approach descends into the regress, as it were. Rather than merely
evaluating the trustworthiness of evidence as it is heard, or adhering to established rules,
the tribunal adjudicates the trustworthiness of an item of evidence, much as it would
adjudicate any other factual claim. Such a process is obviously labor intensive-were it
applied to every item of evidence, it would require halting the judicial inquiry each time
a new item of evidence was produced in order to adjudicate the trustworthiness of that
item of evidence. Therefore, this approach must be used sparingly. This is the approach
sometimes adopted with regard to expert evidence whose trustworthiness may plausibly
be challenged under the legal regime associated with the Daubert decision and its
progeny cases. 0
Given the "regress-ive" nature of a Daubert inquiry-that it is, in effect, a trial
within a trial-a curious phenomenon emerges. The adjudication of the trustworthiness
of an item of evidence must necessarily rely on-what else?--evidence. Thus, a
Daubert inquiry seeks evidence about evidence, and the very word "evidence" takes on
dual, confusing meanings.
It should be noted that, while the regress is potentially infinite, Daubert artificially
halts the regress after one step. In principle, the regress could continue, like nested
Russian dolls. Courts do not, as far as I know, have Daubert hearings within Daubert
hearings. Presumably, the justification is merely pragmatic: There must be some limits
to the courts' inquiries into the epistemological foundations of the evidence they use.
The question of fact to be decided in a Daubert inquiry is the trustworthiness-or,
to use the Court's term-the "reliability" of the item of evidence that will then be
inserted into the larger trial that envelops the Daubert inquiry as evidence in support of
some larger question of fact, such as criminal culpability or civil liability. The court is
asked to decide the question of the reliability of evidence by reference to evidence-
evidence about the reliability of the evidence. Daubert holds that the court must find
that the evidence supporting the claim that the evidence is reliable before allowing the
evidence to be inserted into the enveloping trial." 1
Daubert, in short, insists that one form of evidence, expert evidence, be found
reliable before being used in a trial. It requires the court to, as Professor Haack puts it,
"[t]hink before you think!" 12 But, this finding of reliability, in turn, must be based on
evidence. One way of conceptualizing the Daubert approach to expert evidence, a way
that has not to my knowledge hitherto been proposed, is by reference to a movement that
arose nearly contemporaneously with Daubert itself: The rise of "evidence-based
medicine" (EBM) and the ensuing extension of this metaphor to other areas, including
10. As far as I know, Daubert hearings are the only legal procedures that adopt this approach. Courts do
not hold evidentiary hearings to assess the reliability of, say, eyewitness evidence. Professor Natapoff has,
however, proposed such an approach to informant testimony. Alexandra Natapoff, Beyond Unreliable: How
Snitches Contribute to Wrongful Convictions, 37 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 107, 109, 112-15 (2006).
11. Daubert, 509 U.S. at579-98.
12. Susan Haack, An Epistemologist in the Bramble-Bush: At the Supreme Court with Mr. Joiner, 26 J.
Health, Pol., Policy & L. 217, 217 (2001) (citation omitted).
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"evidence-based policy," 13 "evidence-based corrections,'' 14 "evidence-based policing," 15
"evidence-based crime prevention," 16 "evidence-based justice, "evidence-based
sociology," 18 and even the "evidence-based society." 19  In this vein, Daubert might
usefully be conceived of as a demand in law for "evidence-based evidence," or, more
precisely, "evidence-based expert evidence." In this essay, I will briefly explain the
concept of evidence-based medicine and its spread to other policy arenas. I will then
explore how the "evidence-based" metaphor might apply to law. Next, I will explore the
applicability of the notion of "evidence-based evidence" to one application of Daubert
that has proved particularly vexing for courts: Admissibility challenges to latent print
(fingerprint) evidence under Daubert.
II. EVIDENCE-BASED MEDICINE AND ITS EXTENSIONS TO POLICY
The conceptual origins of what is today called "evidence-based medicine" (EBM)
have been variously traced as far back as Avicenna2° or nineteenth century France. 2 1 As
a contemporary social movement, however, EBM is frequently traced to the work of
physician Archie Cochrane and specifically to a 1972 publication, Effectiveness and
22Efficiency. Cochrane called for demanding evaluations of the efficacy of treatments
where possible, rather than ordering treatments based on clinical knowledge. Although
Cochrane proposed the essential idea of EBM, the term itself was not used in the
literature until 1991. 23 It is interesting to note that this was only two years before the
Daubert opinion, and yet the connection between EBM and Daubert, the way in which
Daubert and EBM may be read as asking nearly precisely the same question, does not
appear to have been explicitly explored.24
Today, EBM is defined as "the conscientious, explicit, and judicious use of current
13. The term is attributed to Adrian F.M. Smith by Wikipedia. Wikipedia, Evidence-Based Policy,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evidence-basedpolicy (accessed Apr. 3, 2008). However, Smith does not use the
term in his article on the "evidence-based society." Adrian F.M. Smith, Mad Cows and Ecstasy: Chance and
Choice in an Evidence-Based Society, 159 J. Royal Statist. Soc. Series A 367, 367 (1996). But see Ray
Pawson, Evidence-Based Policy: The Promise of 'Realist Synthesis', 8 Evaluation 340, 340 (2002).
14. Doris MacKenzie, Evidence-Based Corrections: Identifying What Works, 46 Crime & Delinquency
457, 457 (2000).
15. Lawrence W. Sherman, Evidence-Based Policing: Social Organization of Information for Social
Control, in Crime and Social Organization 217 (Elin Waring & David Weisburd eds., Transaction 2002).
16. Lawrence W. Sherman, Evidence-Based Crime Prevention (Routledge 2002).
17. Lawrence W. Sherman & Heather Strang, Evidence-Based Justice, 365 Lancet 469, 469 (2005).
18. Stefan Timmermans & Emily S. Kolker, Evidence-Based Medicine and the Reconfiguration of Medical
Knowledge, 45 J. Health & Soc. Behavior 177, 177 (2004).
19. Smith, supran. 13, at 367.
20. Walter J. Daly & D. Craig Brater, Medieval Contributions to the Search for Truth in Clinical Medicine,
43 Perspectives Biology & Med. 530, 531 (2000).
21. David L. Sackett et al., Evidence Based Medicine: What It Is and What It Isn't, 312 British Med. J. 71
(1996).
22. Archie Cochrane, Effectiveness and Efficiency: Random Reflections on Health Services (RMS Press
1972); Stefan Timmermans & Marc Berg, The Gold Standard: The Challenge of Evidence-Based Medicine and
Standardization in Health Care (Temple U. Press 2003); R. E. Ashcroft, Current Epistemological Problems in
Evidence Based Medicine, 30 J. Med. Ethics 131, 131 (2004).
23. G. H. Guyatt, Evidence-Based Medicine, 114 Annals Internal Med. A (1991).
24. Though the two phenomena have been discussed together, as in John M. Eisenberg, What Does
Evidence Mean? Can the Law and Medicine Be Reconciled? 26 J. Health, Pol., Policy & L. 369, 369-72
(2001).
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best evidence in making decisions about the care of individual patients."25 The term has
an almost comically self-evident sound to it; lay persons might wonder whether medical
decisions were not based on evidence prior to 1991 or 1972? (This may also explain the
term's rhetorical power: Who could be against "evidence-based medicine'?) 26 In fact,
however, medicine has long relied on and heavily valued clinical experience in making
decisions about diagnoses and treatments. The rise of EBM was spurred by a number of
disturbing findings. First, it was noted that many treatments were widely applied without
any convincing evidence of their efficacy. 27 Some of these treatments were later found
to be ineffective-that is, to do more harm than good. 28 Second, wide discrepancies in
the ordering of tests and treatments were found across different geographic areas of
practice. 29 The implication was that medical decisions were likely being governed by
local practice rather than by, say, published findings in international medical journals
(which would presumably produce like practices in different geographic reasons). By
emphasizing "evidence," proponents of EBM sought, when possible, to substitute the
results of empirical studies, or what promoters of EBM tend to call "external
evidence, '3° for clinical experience. By "external evidence," EBM meant, most of all,
the randomized clinical trial (RCT). Ideally, when possible, meta-analysis (one of the
forms of evidence at issue in Daubert itself, incidentally) 3 1 could be used to aggregate
the results of evidence produced by all credible RCTs.
EBM is not without controversy. Critics have charged that EBM devalues clinical
expertise that may be capable of decision making that applies to individual patients,
rather than statistical populations. 32 As a sociologist of science, I also recognize that
EBM is a discourse, like any other. A turn to EBM, rather than neatly resolving all
problems of medical knowledge, may be expected to generate further debates about what
counts as "evidence" and what claims should be considered "evidence-based." 33 It is
also well recognized that basing medical decisions on aggregated RCTs is an ideal which
cannot be achieved for all medical treatments. For many treatments, RCTs may be
impossible, unethical, or unfeasibly costly. In response, proponents of EBM have
emphasized that clinical experience retains a role in EBM in conjunction with evidence
derived from studies. EBM proposes a "hierarchy of evidence" with RCTs at the apex
and clinical experience at the base. At its most innocuous, EBM is merely insisting that
evidence from controlled studies, when available, not be ignored in favor of clinical
25. Sackett et al., supra n. 21, at 71.
26. Mark A. Peterson, Evidence: Its Meanings in Health Care and in Law, 26 J. Health, Pol., Policy & L.
191, 191 (2001) ("Evidence is the apple pie of analysis and decision making. Who could be against it?").
27. Timmermans & Kolker, supra n. 18, at 177.
28. Id. at 182.
29. Id. at 188.
30. Sackett et al., supra n. 21, at 71.
31. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 582-84.
32. Ashcroft, supra n. 22, at 134.
33. For sociologically informed and critical discussions of EBM, see Dawn Freshwater & Gary Rolfe,
Deconstructing Evidence-Based Practice (Routledge 2004); Timmermans & Berg, supra n. 22, at 178; Mark
Avis & Dawn Freshwater, Evidence for Practice, Epistemology, and Critical Reflection, 7 Nursing Phil. 216,
216-17 (2006); Alberto Cambrosio et al., Regulatory Objectivity and the Generation and Management of
Evidence in Medicine, 63 Soc. Sci. & Med. 189, 195-96 (2006).
2007]
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assessments.
34
Nonetheless, EBM has been enormously influential in health care, and it has
proven a powerful metaphor suitable for importation into other areas of technical
decision making. In a 1996 lecture, statistician Adrian Smith broadened the metaphor to
endorse the notion of an "evidence-based society." 35 Though Smith did not use the term,
his lecture has been credited with giving rise to an "evidence-based policy" movement.
36
Smith specifically mentioned penal policy as a potential target of his proposed call for
demanding that evidence govern policy, and, indeed, criminologists have developed,
"evidence-based policing," 37 "evidence-based justice,"38 and "evidence-based crime
prevention." 39 In 2005, my own academic department founded a Center for Evidence-
Based Corrections. 40 Again, the seemingly comical self-evident nature of the term-was
correctional policy not based on evidence prior to 2005?--contained more than a small
grain of truth: Numerous commentators have noted that correctional policy is often
governed more by politics than by criminological evidence.
4 1
Interestingly, Smith also explicitly mentioned law in his 1996 lecture. Because
"[flor many people, the word evidence conjures up an immediate association with the
law," Smith found it "somewhat paradoxical ... that the procedures and protocols of UK
law-courts seem so much at odds with the kinds of disciplined scientific reasoning that
many of us would see as essential in an evidence-based society. ' '42 Understood in this
way, the Daubert regime might be seen as both an effort and opportunity for law to join
the "evidence-based society."
III. APPLYING THE EVIDENCE-BASED METAPHOR TO LAW
How would the "evidence-based" metaphor map onto law? At first glance, it
would appear that a criminal trial is already the equivalent of EBM. A fact-finder draws
upon the best available evidence to determine the truth of competing factual claims. The
fact-finder presumably privileges evidence derived from empirical studies, but, like a
physician, will draw on clinical and even anecdotal knowledge to supplement
information from such studies, or even substitute for it if no such studies are available.
This mapping seems appropriate if one conceives EBM in terms of an individual medical
practitioner making decisions for an individual patient. The physician draws upon the
34. Ashcroft, supra n. 22, at 132, 134 ("It should be obvious.., that EBM is not designed to be a
comprehensive account of medical knowledge but only an account of that part of medical knowledge which is
propositional.").
35. Smith, supra n. 13, at 367.
36. Wikipedia, supra n. 13; Pawson, supra n. 13, at 340.
37. Sherman, supran. 15.
38. Sherman & Strang, supra n. 17, at 469.
39. Sherman, supra n. 16.
40. U. Cal., Center for Evidence-Based Corrections, http://ucicorrections.seweb.uci.edu/ (accessed Apr. 3,
2008).
41. See e.g. Franklin E. Zimring et al., Punishment and Democracy: Three Strikes and You're Out in
California (Oxford 2001); Elliott Currie, Against Marginality: Arguments for a Public Criminology, II
Theoretical Criminology 175, 175 (2007).
42. Smith, supra n. 13, at 370. Interestingly, the case Smith points to as an example of the law's
indifference to statistical evidence is one that my co-authors and I discuss as well in Michael Lynch et al.,
Truth Machine: The Contentious History of DNA Fingerprinting (forthcoming).
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best available evidence, to make the best possible decision about the particular "case."
One can readily appreciate that concepts derived from EBM might be useful in the
process. In particular, EBM's hierarchy of evidence might prove useful in helping fact-
finders weigh the relative value of different types of evidence. Convincing fact-finders
to treat evidence derived from RCTs as stronger than evidence derived from clinical
experience might prove quite useful. In addition, EBM has endorsed Bayesian methods
of weighing evidence, 43 and many of the most sophisticated legal evidence scholars
likewise advocate Bayesian approaches for assessing the weight of evidence.
44
However, in this essay I am concerned with the application of EBM not to the problem
of weighing evidence, but to its admissibility.
In addition to weighing evidence at the level of individual decision making, EBM
also involves another layer, in which information is distilled from the compendium of
knowledge to produce the "evidence" that individual medical decisions are supposed to
be based upon. EBM does not envision each individual physician locating, reading,
analyzing, and meta-analyzing all the available scientific studies concerning a particular
treatment each time they consider applying that treatment to a patient. Such a procedure
would obviously be impractical, especially in light of studies showing that many medical
practitioners report spending less than an hour per week reading journals. 45 Instead,
EBM envisions that the process of evaluating the state of knowledge concerning a
particular treatment would be done by some centralized body, rather than by each
individual practitioner on an ad hoc basis. One of the most common ways in which this
"centralizing" or "standardizing" process is achieved is through the production of
"clinical practice guidelines," standardized statements about the efficacy or
appropriateness of particular treatments in particular situations. 46 It is very often these
guidelines that are then supposed to constitute the "evidence" upon which medical
decisions should, according to EBM, be "based."
This process of producing knowledge about the efficacy of certain treatments is, I
would suggest, analogous, not to the trial, but to the Daubert inquiry, in which the court
adjudicates, not a factual dispute, but the reliability of an item of evidence intended to be
used in a factual dispute. In EBM, this is done by evaluating the available evidence
concerning the treatment's efficacy, and it would seem that in a Daubert inquiry the
process the Supreme Court envisioned would be much the same: Evaluating the available
evidence concerning the reliability of the item of evidence at issue.
IV. APPLYING THE NOTION OF EVIDENCE-BASED EVIDENCE To FORENSIC EVIDENCE
In this section, I want to suggest that conceptualizing the Daubert inquiry as
demand for evidence-based evidence may prove helpful in understanding an area in
43. A.S. Elstein, On the Origins and Development of Evidence-Based Medicine and Medical Decision
Making, 53 Inflammation Research 184 (2004).
44. See e.g. Terence Anderson et al., Analysis of Evidence (2d ed., Cambridge U. Press 2005); Richard
Lempert, Some Caveats Concerning DNA as Criminal Identification Evidence: With Thanks to the Reverend
Bayes, 13 Cardozo L. Rev. 303 (1991).
45. Sackett et al., supra n. 21, at 71.
46. Timmermans & Berg, supra n. 22; Arnold J. Rosoff, Evidence-Based Medicine and the Law: The
Courts Confront Clinical Practice Guidelines, 26 . Health, Pol., Policy & L. 327 (2001).
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which the application of Daubert has appeared particularly vexing for courts: forensic
evidence.
Daubert was a civil case, and it is possible that its impact on evidence used in
criminal law was unanticipated.47 Anticipated or not, it is now well known that
numerous areas of forensic evidence have been subjected to vigorous admissibility
challenges in the wake of Daubert. What has been startling about these challenges is
that they have taken on some of the most widely trusted forms of evidence in the
American justice system. "The paramount example" in this regard has been latent print
evidence.48  Although it is true that the vast majority of such challenges have been
unsuccessful at rendering the evidence inadmissible, and some courts have characterized
the challenges as laughable on their face,49 several decisions seem to indicate that the
claim that latent print evidence is inadmissible under Daubert is at least arguable. For
example, in United States v. Llera Plaza I, the court restricted the scope of expert
testimony about latent print evidence, based on it failing all the Daubert factors save
"general acceptance." 50 The court reversed the outcome of this ruling ten weeks later,
but many of its findings stood, including the finding that latent print evidence failed two
of the Daubert factors. 5 1  In Virgin Islands v. Jacobs, the court ruled latent print
evidence inadmissible under Daubert after the government neglected to make any
evidentiary showing in response to the defendant's Daubert motion. 52 In United States
v. Crisp, one Fourth Circuit judge wrote that the trial judge's admission of latent print
evidence despite failing to comply with Daubert was an abuse of discretion. 53 In Utah v.
Quintana, one Utah Court of Appeals judge wrote that the defendant was entitled to a
jury instruction highlighting the fallibility and lack of standards of latent print analysis.54
In United States v. Sullivan, the court found latent print evidence inadmissible despite
finding that it was untested and therefore failed the "testing" prong of Daubert, arguably
the most important prong. 55 In Commonwealth v. Patterson, the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts found a particular form of latent print evidence, known as
"simultaneous impressions," inadmissible. 56 In State v. Langill, a trial court found latent
print evidence inadmissible because the expert witness violated the laboratory's protocol
with regard to documentation and blind "verification," a ruling that was reversed on
appeal. And, in State v. Rose, in a Frye jurisdiction, a court, for the first time, issued an
unqualified prohibition against latent print evidence.
57
Despite the limited or full restrictions on the evidence in some of the above cases,
the fact remains that by and large the vast majority of admissibility challenges to latent
47. See generally Michael J. Saks, Banishing Ipse Dixit: The Impact of Kumho Tire on Forensic
Identification Science, 57 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 879 (2000).
48. Berger, supra n. 2, at 64.
49. U.S. v. Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d 848, 849 (S.D. Ind. 2000).
50. U.S. v. Lera Plaza (Llera Plaza 1), 179 F. Supp. 2d 492, 516-17 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
51. U.S. v. Lera Plaza (Llera Plaza 11), 188 F. Supp. 2d 549, 549 (E. D. Pa. 2002).
52. 2001 WL 1735083 at *5 (D.V.I. Dec. 28, 2001).
53. 324 F.3d 261 (4th Cir. 2003) (Michael, J., dissenting).
54. 103 P.3d 168, 170 (Utah App. 2004) (Thorne, J., concurring).
55. 246 F. Supp. 2d 700, 704 (E.D. Ky. 2003).
56. 840 N.E.2d 12, 32-33 (Mass. 2005).
57. No. K06-0545 (Md. Cir. Balt. Co. 2007) (mer.).
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print evidence proffered by the government have been decided in favor of admitting the
evidence. One might conclude this because the forensic technique is strongly supported
by the available evidence. There is, however, the curious fact that the courts and legal
scholars appear to part company on this issue. Although almost all courts find latent
print evidence admissible, almost all the legal scholarship finds it inadmissible. 58 What
can explain this discrepancy? I would suggest that the explanation is that latent print
evidence does not constitute evidence-based evidence.
V. LATENT PRINT IDENTIFICATION: IS IT EVIDENCE-BASED EVIDENCE?
Latent print individualization is a forensic assay by which a trained analyst,
commonly known as a "latent print examiner" (LPE), seeks to determine whether a print
58. See David Faigman et al., Modern Scientific Evidence: The Law and Science of Expert Testimony § 27-
2.3.1, 386 (2d ed. West 2002) [hereinafter Faigman, Modern Scientific] ("Woe to fingerprint practice were such
[Daubert admissibility] criteria applied."); Jane Campbell Moriarty, Psychological and Scientific Evidence in
Criminal Trials § 12:15 (Clark Boardman Callaghan 2004) ("The assumption of the validity of fingerprinting
rests upon law, rather than science."); Nathan Benedict, Fingerprints and the Daubert Standard for Admission
of Scientific Evidence: Why Fingerprints Fail and a Proposed Remedy, 46 Ariz. L. Rev. 519, 538 (2004)
("[Jiudges have generally relied on their instincts and the long history of judicial acceptance of fingerprint
evidence to admit it without serious consideration of the science behind it."); Berger, supra n. 2, at 64
("Clearly... the courts are not applying Daubert stringently in the criminal context. The paramount example
is fingerprint evidence that has never been validated."); Simon A. Cole, Grandfathering Evidence: Fingerprint
Admissibility Rulings from Jennings to Llera Plaza and Back Again, 41 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1189, 1215 (2004)
("It is clear that no studies exist that measure the accuracy of fingerprint examiners when they make
conclusions of identification."); Robert Epstein, Fingerprints Meet Daubert: The Myth of Fingerprint
"Science" is Revealed, 75 So. Cal. L. Rev. 605, 657 (2002) ("Having considered the various indicators of
reliability set forth by the Supreme Court in Daubert, it is evident that at the present time, latent fingerprint
identifications do not constitute reliable evidence."); Evidence-Fingerprint Experts-Seventh Circuit Upholds
the Reliability of Expert Testimony Regarding the Source of a Latent Fingerprint, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 2349,
2352 (2002) ("Fingerprint expert testimony does not survive application of the Daubert factors .... "); David
L. Faigman, Is Science Different for Lawyers? 297 Sci. 339, 340 (2002) (fingerprinting has "not been seriously
tested"); Paul Giannelli, Fingerprints Challenged! 17 Crim. Just. 33, 35 (2002) ("In its interpretation of
Daubert, Plaza I is a well-written opinion. Havvard is not."); David H. Kaye, The Nonscience of
Fingerprinting: United States v. Llera Plaza, 21 QLR 1073, 1087 (2003) ("As Llera-Plaza I so clearly reveals,
this [the evidence advanced in support of the admissibility of latent fingerprint individualization] does not
satisfy Daubert."); Tara Marie La Morte, Sleeping Gatekeepers: United States v. Llera Plaza and the
Unreliability of Forensic Fingerprinting Evidence under Daubert, 14 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 171, 173 (2003)
(discussing "strong indications that the fingerprinting field should not survive a rigorous Daubert analysis");
Tamara F. Lawson, Can Fingerprints Lie? Re-weighing Fingerprint Evidence in Criminal Jury Trials, 31 Am.
J. Crim. L. 1, 65 (2003) ("Currently fingerprint analysis is under attack because of the lack of study done on the
accuracy of the examiners .... "); Jennifer L. Mnookin, Fingerprint Evidence In An Age of DNA Profiling, 67
Brook. L. Rev. 13 (2001) ("In the case of fingerprinting, the general rate of error is simply not known.");
Jennifer L. Mnookin, Fingerprints: Not a Gold Standard, 20 Issues Sci. & Tech. 47 (2003) ("Judge Pollak's
first opinion [restricting latent fingerprint individualization testimony] was the better one."); Michael Saks,
Merlin and Solomon: Lessons from the Law's Formative Encounters with Forensic Identification Science, 49
Hastings L.J. 1069, 1106 (1998) ("By conventional scientific standards, any serious search for evidence of the
validity of fingerprint identification is going to be disappointing.... A vote to admit fingerprints is a rejection
of conventional science as the criterion for admission. A vote for science is a vote to exclude fingerprint expert
opinions."); Katherine Schwinghammer, Fingerprint Idenitifcation: How "The Gold Standard of Evidence"
Could Be Worth Its Weight, 32 Am. L. Crim. L. 265, 266 (2005); Jessica M. Sombat, Latent Justice: Daubert's
Impact on the Evaluation of Fingerprint Identification Testimony, 70 Ford. L. Rev. 2819, 2825 (2002) ("[T]he
result Judge Pollak reached when he excluded expert testimony concerning fingerprints [in Llera Plaza I] was
fair."); James E. Starrs, Judicial Control Over Scientific Supermen: Fingerprint Experts and Others Who
Exceed the Bounds, 35 Crim. L. Bulletin 234, 243 (1999) ("Instead of meaning incapable of error, fingerprint
identifications are declared to be infallible on account of the uniqueness of fingerprints to each person .... ");
Sandy L. Zabell, Fingerprint Evidence, 13 J.L. & Policy 143, 178 (2005) ("ACE-V is an acronym, not a
methodology.") (emphasis in original).
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of unknown origin, commonly known as a "latent print" but which we will here,
adopting Champod et al.'s parlance, call a "mark,",59 was made by a particular individual
(often a suspect, but sometimes a victim or other person). The claim that the targeted
individual made the mark is an inference based on the determination that the mark is not
excessively inconsistent with an area of what is known as "friction ridge skin" found on
that individual's body. "Friction ridge skin" is an anatomical term for the corrugated
skin found on primate fingertips, palms, and soles. Examination of these areas show that
they are traversed by lines (known as "ridges") and that these ridges often curve, branch,
and end abruptly. The result is that these anatomical areas are covered with a complex
weave of curving, branching, and connecting ridges that bears the appearance of an
extremely intricate railroad switching yard.
The inference that the mark came from the targeted individual is typically not
made from the friction ridge skin itself, but rather from what is commonly known as an
"inked print," but which we will call, again adopting Champod et al.'s terminology,
simply a "print," to be distinguished from a "mark." A "print" is a deliberately recorded
image of the friction ridge skin. Historically, prints were typically made using ink
pressed onto paper; today they are often digitally scanned. In either case, the print is, of
course, not an exact replica of the friction ridge skin, but an imperfect two-dimensional
representation of a three-dimensional structure.
Thus, the examiner seeks to determine whether the mark is consistent with the
print. Since the origin of the print is factually known-because it was taken from an
individual in custody or from an individual (such as a cooperating witness) whose
identity is otherwise, for practical purposes, unquestioned-if the mark and print are
consistent, the examiner infers that the individual who is factually known to be the
source of the print is also the source of the mark. Reasoning thusly, the examiner
testifies that a particular individual is the source of a mark, which can be enormously
powerful testimony in resolving a legal matter.
One obvious question raised by this description of the process is: What is a finding
of consistency? It is important to note that latent print identification is not based on a
finding of identicality-that the mark and the print are identical. In fact, while the
(rather unspecific, as the reader of the above several paragraphs will now recognize)
truism "no two fingerprints are exactly alike" is well known, latent print examiners hold
equally to the truism that no two prints, even from the source are exactly alike. 60 And,
indeed an examination of marks and prints from cases shows that they are not identical at
all. The claim, after all, is not that they are identical, but that they derive from a
common source.
In short, latent print analysis generates evidence that a particular area of skin is the
source of a particular mark. What sort of evidence would allow a court to assess the
reliability of this form of evidence? (It should be noted that this is quite a different
question from asking whether or not the evidence is "science," "useful," or generally
59. Christophe Champod et al., Fingerprints and Other Ridge Skin Impressions (CRC 2004).
60. Wikipedia, Fingerprint, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fingerprint (accessed Apr. 3, 2008) ("The
flexibility of friction ridge skin means that no two finger or palm prints are ever exactly alike (never identical
in every detail), even two impressions recorded immediately after each other.").
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"good.") The most obvious answer would be some sort of measurement of the accuracy
of LPEs' source attributions-a test of their ability to make correct source attributions.
How often are LPE source attributions correct and how often incorrect?
Such a measurement cannot be derived from casework because in casework we
lack access to "ground truth," knowledge of the true source of any particular mark. Not
even the corroboration of a second expert, known in the trade as "verification," or even
corroboration by an adversarial expert, hired on behalf of the accused, can provide us
with ground truth. Nor does a jury's conclusion that a defendant is guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt of a particular criminal offense constitute ground truth that that
defendant was, in fact, the source of a mark found at the scene of that offense. Indeed,
this is even more so when the jury's conclusion is based, in whole or in part, on an LPE's
opinion that the defendant was the source of the mark. Because accuracy cannot be
measured through casework, accuracy measurement requires deliberately conducting a
simulation in which ground truth can be controlled by the experimenter. The obvious
method would be to manufacture marks deliberately so that their true origin is known to
the experimenter.
Of course, a sophisticated study of this empirical question would not yield a simple
binary answer, such as "95% correct." Rather, a sophisticated study would presumably
yield accuracy rates that varied according to certain parameters. The most obvious ones
are the quality and quantity of information available in the latent print and the skill level
of the examiner, but other parameters might also have an impact of the accuracy of latent
print analysis. For example, Professors Denbeaux and Risinger argue that they are
essentially willing to assume that identifications made from good-quality impressions of
all ten fingers are always correct.6 1 They are also willing to assume that this finding of
absolute correctness would extend down to some smaller amounts of information, though
how much smaller they do not know. Professors Denbeaux and Risinger correctly point
out that Kumho Tire's "task at hand" requirement dictates that courts should distinguish
inquiries into reliability according to the difficulty of various tasks. That is to say: The
question "How accurately can LPEs make source attributions for complete sets of ten
prints of good quality?" is quite different from the question "How accurately can LPEs
make source attributions for single partial latent prints of marginal quality?" The two
questions are quite different and clearly should not yield a single common (or "global,"
as Professors Denbeaux and Risinger put it) answer.
In this, Professors Denbeaux and Risinger are undoubtedly correct, but the more
vexing question is what to do in the current situation in which the proponent of the
evidence has not differentiated its claim into appropriate subtasks. In latent print
admissibility hearings, the government has put forward a "global" claim: That latent
print source attributions are reliable for all items of evidence from which latent print
examiners choose to make source attributions. In earlier historical periods, and in some
countries still, latent print examiners limited their claims by a number of corresponding
61. Mark P. Denbeaux & D. Michael Risinger, Kumho Tire and Expert Reliability: How the Question You
Ask Gives the Answer You Get, 34 Seton Hall L. Rev. 15, 68-69 (2004).
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ridge characteristics, or "points." 62 That is, the claim was: "latent print identification is
accurate for latent prints containing more than twelve [or some other number] ridge
characteristics." Today, for most U.S. practitioners and law enforcement agencies, the
claim is no longer limited in this fashion. Instead, latent print examiners are expected to
report conclusions of identity only for those latent prints for which they believe accuracy
is assured. This yields the rather vaguer claim: "latent print identification is accurate for
those latent prints which examiners believe are 'identifiable.' In other words, the
proponent of the evidence does not concede the seemingly self-evident notion that there
must be a gradation of accuracy according to the amount of information in the object
being analyzed.
The situation is further complicated by the fact that no scale exists upon which the
amount of information in a mark can be specified. Whereas, in the document
examination area that is the primary focus of Professor Denbeaux and Risinger's work,
the subdivision of tasks into subtasks is seemingly self-evident, it is not obvious how to
subdivide latent print source attribution tasks, especially without a scale with which to
measure the amount of information in a mark.
One question in this situation is how a court should respond when presented with a
global claim of this sort. It seems to me that a court would have difficulty imposing a
differentiation of tasks upon the proponent of the evidence, and the court would simply
have to evaluate the evidentiary claim as it is given by the proponent. Another question
is how a scholar should respond when presented with a global claim of this sort. Here
Professors Denbeaux and Risinger and I part company in that they appear to feel a
greater obligation to differentiate tasks and concede the reliability of latent print source
attributions at the easier end of the continuum of task difficulty. I tend to think that it is
the responsibility of the expert making a knowledge claim to specify their claim and
have it evaluated as they specify it. I, therefore, feel less obligated to differentiate latent
print examiners' tasks since, in the face of all reason, they make global claims to
accuracy for all tasks. One possible rationale for such a stance, is that the expert
community should bear a cost for making what, as Professors Denbeaux and Risinger
correctly point out, is an excessively global claim.
In any case, an accuracy measurement, preferably gradated according to the
amount of information contained in the latent print and perhaps other variables as well, is
the sort of evidence about latent print evidence that a court might expect to find. The
reason there is currently a legal controversy over the admissibility of latent print
evidence, however, is that no such evidence has yet been proffered by the govemment in
response to any challenge to the admissibility of latent print evidence.
This is not the same as saying that no such evidence exists. The accuracy data that
does exist is quite poor, but some data from simulations in which ground truth was
known does, in fact, exist. One source of such data derives from proficiency tests
62. Christophe Champod, Edmond Locard-Numerical Standards and 'Probable' Identifications, 45 J.
Forensic Identification 136 (1995); Simon A. Cole, What Counts for Identity? The Historical Origins of the
Methodology of Latent Fingerprint Identification, 12 Sci. Context 139 (1999); European Fingerprint
Standards, 28 Fingerprint World 19 (2002) (reporting fingerprint point standards ranging from 8 [Bulgaria] to
16 [Italy, Cyprus, Gibraltar] points, as well as some countries with no set standard).
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conducted between 1983 and the present by Collaborative Testing Services (CTS) in
conjunction with the American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors. 63 This is not
ideal data from which to generate accuracy measurements. First, the proficiency tests
were conducted by mail. The amount of time taken to complete the tests and the number
of individuals who completed each test are not known. The qualifications of the
individuals who completed the tests are not known. The difficulty level of the test items
is not known. Finally, the proficiency tests were not "masked." In other words, the test-
takers knew that they were taking a test. A masked proficiency test would arguably
better replicate the accuracy of actual casework. For all of these reasons, it can be
argued that the CTS proficiency tests provide only a very crude accuracy measurement
for actual latent print casework. Nonetheless, in the absence of any other data, some
researchers have compiled the accuracy rate on CTS tests.
64
Another source of accuracy data is a study conducted by Wertheim et al., of the
accuracy of trainees during instruction in latent print analysis. 65 Again, the data is far
from ideal. The examiners were trainees, with varying levels of experience in latent
print casework. They were able to choose the difficulty of the prints they undertook to
attribute. They were given "hints" by the instructors. The study's authors characterized
many apparent errors as "clerical errors." 66 Again, these are good reasons to argue that
this study provides only a very crude accuracy measurement for actual latent print
casework.
The stereotypical contours of argument in legal battles over expert evidence
typically consists of studies being put forward by one party followed by methodological
critique of those studies by the opposing party. Actors from both sides of the
controversy agree that the proficiency test data cited above suffers from numerous flaws.
Were the data to be offered as the "evidence" from which the accuracy of latent print
identification should be inferred, it would surely be attacked for those flaws. It is
important to note, however, that this is not the nature of the legal battle over the
admissibility of latent print evidence. Instead, the government has not put forward the
above potential sources of accuracy data in defending against admissibility challenges to
latent print evidence. Indeed, LPEs have publicly criticized defendants' experts for
mentioning these sources of data in such hearings. 67  Further, both sources of data
contain disclaimers that essentially inoculate them against being used as sources of
63. Collaborative Testing Servs., Inc., Latent Prints Examination Report Nos. 9508, 9608, 9708, 9808, 99-
516, 01-516, 02-516, 02-517, 03-516 (1995-2003). Summaries or complete reports are on file with the author,
reports from 2001-2003 available at http://www.collaborativetesting.com/forensics/report_list.html.
64. Lyn Haber & Ralph Norman Haber, Error Rates for Human Fingerprint Examiners, in Automatic
Fingerprint Recognition Systems 339 (Nalini Ratha & Ruud Bolle eds., Springer 2003); Simon A. Cole, More
Than Zero: Accounting for Error in Latent Fingerprint Identification, 95 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 985,
1029-32 (2005).
65. Kasey Wertheim et al., A Report of Latent Print Examiner Accuracy during Comparison Training
Exercises, 56 J. Forensic Identification 55 (2006).
66. Simon A. Cole, The Prevalence and Potential Causes af Wrongful Conviction by Fingerprint Evidence,
37 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 39, 70-71 (2006); Lyn Haber & Ralph Norman Haber, Letter Re: A Report of
Latent Print Examiner Accuracy during Comparison Training Exercises, 56 J. Forensic Identification 493
(2006); Kasey Wertheim et al., Authors' Response to Letter, 56 J. Forensic Identification 500 (2006).
67. Glenn Langenburg, Defending against the Critic's Curse, http://www.clpex.com/Articles/
CriticsCurse.htm (Sept. 2002).
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accuracy data for latent print analysis. Each CTS Report states:
[Since it is the laboratory's] option how the samples are to be used (e.g. training exercise,
known or blind proficiency testing, research and development of new techniques, etc.), the
results compiled in the Summary Report are not intended to be an overview of the quality
of work performed in the profession and cannot be interpreted as such.6 8
Similarly, the Wertheim et al. study states "[t]hese data should.., not be used as a
predictor of error or an estimate of reliability for an examiner on the witness stand." 69
It is important to emphasize, therefore, that, as far as courts engaged in
admissibility determination are concerned, the above two sources of accuracy data do not
exist. They have never been proffered by the government as evidence of the reliability
of latent print evidence. Why this is so can only be known for sure by the prosecutors
who have handled the admissibility challenges to latent print evidence and those who
have advised them, but some speculation is possible. The explanation cannot be that the
government feels that these accuracy rates would result in exclusion of the evidence.
Although Daubert is vague as to precisely how low the error rate of a proffered
technique needs to be in order to render it admissible, it seems unlikely that the relatively
low false positive error rates found in these studies are above this threshold. Since the
government cannot be concerned about the admissibility of the evidence, it must be
concerned about its weight. Given that LPEs apparently believe and often testify that
latent print identification is "100% accurate" and that it has an error rate of "zero," 70 one
can see why the government might be concerned about introducing even these high
accuracy rates into evidence in an admissibility hearing. Once introduced in an
admissibility hearing, they would presumably become fodder for cross-examination.
Astonishingly, even data showing very high accuracy would have the effect of
downgrading the probative value of the evidence from the current status quo.
The analogy with medicine offers a potential explanation for the absence of
accuracy measurements of latent print analysis. As noted above, there are many medical
interventions that cannot practically, ethically, or cost-effectively generate success rate
measurements. In such cases, even proponents of EBM are satisfied to rely on clinical
judgments. Is latent print analysis analogous to one of these areas of medicine? Should
latent print analysis simply be treated as a clinical judgment?
Certainly, as I have argued elsewhere drawing on the work of the historian Carlo
Ginzburg, one can conceive of latent print analyses as clinical judgments. 7 1 However, I
have suggested that they are, in fact, clinical judgments that have been presented to their
consumers as something more accurate and precise. 72 In any case, there is nothing about
latent print analysis that makes it like one of those areas of medicine for which is
practically or ethically unfeasible to generate success rate measurements. While it seems
68. Collaborative Testing Servs., supra n. 64.
69. Wertheim et al., supra n. 65, at 81.
70. Cole, supra n. 64, at 990.
71. Simon A. Cole, Jackson Pollock, Judge Pollak, and the Dilemma of Fingerprint Expertise, in Expertise
in Regulation and Law 98 (Gary Edmond ed., Ashgate 2004); Carlo Ginzburg, Morelli, Freud, and Sherlock
Holmes: Clues and Scientific Method, in The Sign of Three: Dupin, Holmes, Peirce 81 (Umberto Eco &
Thomas A. Sebeok eds., Indiana U. Press 1983).
72. Simon A. Cole, A Little Art, A Little Science, A Little 'CSI', N.Y. Times 31 (Dec. 31, 2006).
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reasonable to deem admissible clinical judgments that cannot practically or ethically
generate success rate measurements, this exemption would not appear to apply to latent
print evidence.
VI. LATENT PRINT EVIDENCE IN TRIAL COURT DAUBERTINQUIRIES
The upshot of this, of course, is that, as far as courts are concerned, there is no
accuracy data for latent print source attributions. In other words, there is no evidence, of
the sort that practitioners of EBM would consider "evidence," as to the accuracy of this
form of evidence. In the absence of conventional accuracy data, what sort of evidence
have courts relied on in finding latent print expert testimony admissible? It is not
possible to answer this question comprehensively because such determinations are made
at the trial court level. Many trial courts make such decisions without issuing written
rulings, as did the court in the first such challenge in United States v. Mitchell. Even if
the trial court does issue a written ruling it may not be published.73 Below, I will discuss
the evidence that trial courts have cited in support of the claim that latent print analysis is
reliable. For each evidentiary claim, I will explain why it does not constitute evidence of
reliability of latent print analysis. Although there are some appellate court rulings
concerning the admissibility of latent print evidence, I will not discuss them here.
Instead, I restrict my discussion here to direct reports of trial court rulings. Although
some of the appellate court rulings do invoke purported evidence of the reliability of
latent print evidence, strictly speaking, the issue before the appellate court is not the
reliability of latent print evidence itself, but rather whether the trial court's decision was
an abuse of discretion. 74  In addition, the appellate court rulings have already been
extensively discussed and critiqued in the legal literature.
75
A. Evidence of Legal Admission and Use of Latent Print Evidence
In some cases, the court treated the fact that latent print analysis has long been
considered admissible, reliable evidence in courts of law, as evidence of the reliability of
latent print evidence. 76 But a legal finding of reliability cannot be considered scientific
evidence of unreliability, unless the legal finding is based upon some sort of scientific
evidence of reliability. A look at the cited cases demonstrates that this is not the case-
that the legal findings of reliability are assertions devoid of any reference to a scientific
study or data.
77
73. Though latent print examiners have made available some of the unpublished decisions. Daubert Links,
Legal Challenge to Fingerprints, http://onin.com/fp/daubert-links.html (last updated Sept. 15, 2005).
74. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 138-39.
75. See e.g. Benedict, supra n. 59; Cole, supra n. 59; Faigman, supra n. 7; Lawson, supra n. 59; Mnookin,
supra n. 59; Michael J. Saks, Reliability Standards: Too High, Too Low, or Just Right? The Legal and
Scientific Evaluation of Forensic Science (Especially Fingerprint Expert Testimony), 33 Seton Hall L. Rev.
1167 (2003); Schwinghammer, supra n. 59; Sombat, supra n. 59.
76. See e.g. U.S. v. Frias, 2003 WL 352502 at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2003); U.S. v. Cruz-Rivera, 2002 WL
662128 at *1 (D.P.R. Mar. 27, 2002).
77. Cole, supran. 58, at 1275.
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B. Evidence that Latent Print Identification Has Been Used in Court for around a
Century
In some cases, courts have treated the fact that latent print evidence has been used
in criminal cases for around one hundred years as evidence of the reliability of latent
print evidence. Best known in this regard is United States v. Havvard, in which the
Southern District of Indiana stated, "the methods of latent print identification can be and
have been tested. They have been tested for roughly 100 years. They have been tested
in adversarial proceedings with the highest possible stakes-liberty and sometimes
life."' 78 This reasoning was later criticized in United States v. Llera Plaza L79 Such
assertions cannot serve as evidence of the reliability of latent print identification because
the ground truth in casework is not known. Although we know that latent print evidence
was used in a large number of criminal cases over the last hundred years, we do not
know the frequency with which it produced correct results. This constitutes evidence
that the latent print evidence was used, not evidence that it was used correctly. We know
that it does not always produce correct results because there are known cases of
misidentification. 80 However, we cannot assume that the cases in which latent print
analysis produced erroneous results are limited to those cases in which a
misidentification has been exposed, agreed upon by practitioners, and made publicly
known. In order to make such an assumption, we would have to further assume that we
have perfect exposure mechanisms that detect all errors in latent print analysis. There is
little reason to believe this is true. Neither "verification" (confirmation of the result by a
second examiner from within the analyzing laboratory) nor defense review have been
routine for most of the past century. Moreover, both verification and defense review
have been implicated in erroneous identifications. 81 In other words, we are aware of
known cases in which both verification and defense review failed to detect erroneous
results.
Moreover, most known erroneous identifications have been exposed through
fortuitous events, not routine procedures. 82  This too, suggests that our exposure
mechanisms are far from perfect. Finally, as I have shown elsewhere, believing that
actual errors are limited to exposed errors would also require believing that errors have
been occurring much more frequently over the last two decades than during the
preceding eight decades, and that errors occur far more frequently in homicide cases and
other serious crimes. 83 No one has advanced an argument as to why this might be the
78. Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 854. See also State v. Cole, 2002 WL 1397452 (Del. Super. June 19,
2002); U.S. v. George, 2002 WL 1727334 (N.D. Ill. July 24, 2002); U.S. v. Merritt, 2002 WL 31854949 (S.D.
Ind. Nov. 4, 2002); US. v. Cheshier, 2001 WL 849346 (S.D. Ind. June 1, 2001); U.S. v. Cline, 188 F. Supp. 2d
1287 (D. Kan. 2002); U.S. v. Reaux, 2001 WL 883221 (E.D. La. July 31, 2001); US. v. Joseph, 2001 WL
562988 (E.D. La. May 22, 2001).
79. 179 F. Supp. 2d 492.
80. Cole, supra n. 64, at 985.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1020-23.
83. Id. at 1018-19. 16
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case.
To be sure, the relatively small number of exposed errors over the past century
would seem to place some limits on the actual frequency of misidentification. For
example, it is difficult to believe that misidentifications occur in half of all analyses and
yet are exposed at such a low rate. With proper caution, therefore, an argument might be
laid out that treats the large number of deployments of latent print analysis and the low
number of exposed errors as vague and weak evidence that the rate of misidentification
is not enormously high. Professor Mnookin, a self-described "fingerprint moderate," has
articulated how an argument treating the century of use of latent print evidence as a
"natural experiment ' 84 might be responsibly made. 85 Were a court to adopt Professor
Mnookin's argument, intellectual responsibility would require that it acknowledge, at the
same time, that there must be an unknown number of cases in which the latent print
evidence was erroneous, but we have not become aware of its erroneousness. 86 Notably,
however, no court has advanced the sort of carefully formulated argument that Professor
Mnookin makes. Instead, courts have made the argument that courts should treat as a
correct identification each deployment of latent print analysis that is not exposed as a
misidentification.
C. Testimonial Claims That One Laboratory (the FBILaboratory) Was Not Aware of
Having Rendered any Erroneous Conclusions of Individualization
In United States v. Llera Plaza II, the court's finding of the reliability of latent
print source attributions made by the Federal Bureau of Investigation Laboratory relied
heavily on the testimonial claim of an employee of that laboratory that the FBI was
unaware of having made any erroneous identifications. 87 Since ground truth is not
known in casework, practitioners' unawareness of having made errors cannot reasonably
be treated as evidence of their not having committed errors.88 In any case, this claim,
even if true at the time, can, of course, no longer be made. Within less than two years,
the FBI committed an error that was publicly exposed.8 9 It should be noted that this
error was apparently publicly exposed only because of a media leak; had it not been
publicly exposed, courts might still be relying on this supposed "evidence" to make
findings of the reliability of latent print evidence.
9 °
84. Strictly speaking, Professor Mnookin's characterization of this as a "natural experiment" is not correct
because this history of use does not create two categories of data, one of which can be characterized as a
control and one of which can be characterized as a treatment.
85. Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Validity of Latent Fingerprint Identification: Confessions of a Fingerprinting
Moderate, __ L., Probability & Risk _ (forthcoming).
86. See Simon A. Cole, 'Implicit Testing': Can Casework Validate Forensic Techniques? 46 Jurimetrics
117, 126 (2006).
87. 188 F. Supp. 2d at 575-76.
88. Cole, supra n. 64, at 1210; Kaye, supra n. 58, at 1087; La Morte, supra n. 58.
89. Robert B. Stacey, A Report on the Erroneous Fingerprint Individualization in the Madrid Train
Bombing Case, 54 J. Forensic Identification 706 (2004).
90. U.S. Dept. Just. Off. Inspector Gen., A Review of the FBI's Handling of the Brandon Mayfield Case
(Mar. 2006).
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D. Latent Print Conclusions Can Be Verified by Other Experts
Some courts supported their conclusions that latent print evidence is reliable by
reference to the fact that latent print conclusions were subject to review by additional
experts. 9 1 Making a claim that can be refuted (or "falsified" to use the Popperian
terminology adopted by the Daubert Court) is not the same as providing evidence of the
reliability of the claims one makes. But, in any case, such reviews only support the
conclusion that experts' opinions are consistent, not that they are accurate. In fact, of the
known cases of misidentification, most of them were actually confirmed by additional
examiners, many of them by multiple additional examiners, and some of them even by
examiners retained on behalf of the defendants.
92
E. Summary
None of this evidence, even if taken at face value, addresses the question of the
accuracy of latent print individualization. In addition, none of the literature defending
latent print individualization offers any evidence concerning the accuracy of latent print
individualization. 93 In the absence of any information as to the accuracy of latent print
individualization conclusions, an informed, reasonable observer certainly might not
"accept" conclusions of individualizations. Indeed, while not all expert knowledge
claims necessarily lend themselves to conventional validation through controlled
experiments, just as not all medical interventions lend themselves to RCTs, given the
nature of the latent print examiners' claim-that they can correctly identify the source of
latent print to the exclusion of all other possible sources in the universe-any
"rationalist" would demand some sort of empirical measurement of their accuracy rate.
94
It is important to emphasize that this is not a situation in which adversaries dispute
the persuasiveness of competing evidence. Government responses to admissibility
challenges to latent print evidence consist of arguments, but they do not produce
anything that would be recognized as evidence in any rationalist endeavor, like science,
medicine, policy, or journalism. Latent print evidence is not evidence-based evidence.
F. Trial Court Rulings Finding an Absence of Evidence Supporting the Reliability of
Latent Print Evidence
A minority of trial court admissibility rulings have acknowledged that latent print
evidence is not evidence-based evidence. In United States v. Sullivan, the Eastern
District of Kentucky, noted "that, while the ACE-V methodology appears to be amenable
to testing, such testing has not yet been performed." 95 However, the court found "that
91. See e.g. U.S. v. Salim, 189 F. Supp. 2d 93, 101 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); U.S. v. Martinez-Cintron, 136 F. Supp.
2d 17, 21 (D.P.R. 2001); Cheshier, 2001 WL 849346.
92. Cole, supra n. 64, at 1023-24.
93. Simon A. Cole, Is Fingerprint Identification Valid? Rhetorics of Reliability in Fingerprint Proponents'
Discourse, 28 L. & Policy 109 (2006).
94. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Meaning of "Appropriate Validation" in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Interpreted in Light of the Broader Rationalist Tradition, not the Narrow Scientific
Tradition, 30 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 735, 759 (2003).
95. 246 F. Supp. 2d at 704.
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this concern does not render fingerprint evidence unreliable for the purposes of
Daubert," reasoning that lack of testing went to the weight, not the admissibility, of the
evidence.
96
Another such decision is Rose, the first case mandating a blanket exclusion of
latent print evidence. 97  Press attention has focused on the court's discussion of the
notorious Mayfield case, in which the FBI committed a misidentification. 98  But the
commission of a misidentification, even a high-profile misidentification by the FBI and
its ratification by an examiner retained by the defendant, does not logically support
exclusion of the evidence. First, misidentifications have been known to the courts since
the 1920s. More importantly, no admissibility standard demands an absence of error as a
condition of admissibility-such a demand would be absurd. Instead, admission requires
evidence of reliability.
Rather than being undone by the Mayfield case, a closer reading of the trial court's
opinion would seem to suggest that the government simply did not put forward any
evidence supporting the reliability of the latent print source attributions. As the court put
it, "the State did not prove in this case that opinion testimony by experts regarding the
ACE-V method of latent print identification rests upon a reliable factual foundation."
99
The court noted that,
While the ACE-V methodology appears amenable to testing, such tests have not been
performed. The principles underlying ACE-V, that is the uniqueness and permanence of
fingerprints, cannot substitute for testing of ACE-V. There have been no studies to
establish how likely it is that partial prints taken from a crime scene will be a match for
only one set of fingerprints in the world. 
100
In its denial of the State's motion for reconsideration, the court further noted that "the
Defendant demonstrated that there are no studies of the ACE-V method to determine the
reliability of the methodology."
10 1
Crucial in this regard is the issue of the burden of proof in an admissibility hearing.
Authorities agree that the burden of proof in an admissibility hearing rests upon the
proponent of the evidence. 102 However, the Rose opinion was among the few opinions
96. Id.
97. No. K06-0545 (Md. Cir. Bait. Co. 2007). Maryland is a Frye, not a Daubert, jurisdiction. Nonetheless,
a demand for evidence of reliability of the proffered evidence is' crucial in the opinion. For an argument that
latent print evidence is likewise inadmissible under Frye, as it is under Daubert, see Simon A. Cole, Out of the
Daubert Fire and into the Fryeing Pan? The Admissibility of Latent Print Evidence in Frye Jurisdictions, __
Minn. J. L., Sci. & Tech. _ (forthcoming).
98. Jennifer McMenamin, Judge Bars Use of Partial Prints in Murder Trial, Bait. Sun IA (Oct. 23, 2007)
("In explaining her reasoning in a 32-page decision, the judge leaned heavily on the case of an Oregon lawyer
mistakenly linked through fingerprint analysis to the 2004 Madrid train bombings."). On Mayfield, see Cole,
supra n. 65, at 985-87; U.S. Dept. Just. Off. Inspector Gen., A Review of the FBI's Handling of the Brandon
Mayfield Case (Mar. 2006); William C. Thompson & Simon A. Cole, Lessons from the Brandon Mayfield
Case, 29 Champion 42 (Apr. 2005); Steven T. Wax & Christopher J. Schatz, A Multitude of Errors: The
Brandon Mayfield Case, 26 Champion 6 (Oct. 2004).
99. Rose, No. K06-0545, slip op. at 1 (quoted from memorandum decision re reconsideration).
100. Rose, No. K06-0545, slip op. at 26 (internal citations omitted) (quoted from memorandum decision).
101. Rose, No. K06-0545, slip op. at 17 (quoted from memorandum decision re reconsideration).
102. Saks, supra n. 76, at 1173 ("Elementary principles of law place the burden of proof on the proponent of
the admission of evidence. Accordingly, Daubert places the initial burden of production on the proponent of
the proffered expert witness .... ").
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in the line of latent print admissibility challenges to acknowledge this. In one such case,
Virgin Islands v. Jacbos, the court excluded latent print evidence in which the
government put forward no evidence whatsoever concerning the reliability of latent print
evidence. 10 3 But, in what is probably the best known such case, United States v. Llera
Plaza II, the court shifted the burden of proof to the defendant making the absence of
evidence concerning the accuracy of latent print evidence count against the opponent of
the evidence.10 4 In United States v. Mitchell, the court unabashedly shifted the burden to
the opponent of the evidence. 10 5 In Rose, however, the court noted that "the burden is
on the proponent of the evidence to prove the reliability" of the evidence. 10 6  It
concluded that "the State did not meet that burden in this case." 10 7 In its denial of the
State's Motion for Reconsideration, the court admitted that it was "surprising ... to this
Court that the State was not able to meet its burden of proof in this case," and stated that
"it has been shocking to the community."'
10 8
VII. CONCLUSION
It is indeed shocking that the government appears unable to muster any evidence of
reliability for a technique as venerable as latent print identification. The fact that the
government cannot support the claim of reliability does not, of course, necessarily mean
that that the technique is highly inaccurate. Perhaps one reason that it is so difficult to
muster evidence in support of latent print evidence, however, is that courts have been
shielding the government from the demand for evidence of reliability. In the pre-
Daubert era courts allowed latent print evidence to win admissibility based on the ipse
dixit of its practitioners. 10 9  In the post-Daubert era, they continued to allow
admissibility without demanding what any rationalist enterprise would treat as evidence
of reliability. These rulings not only protected the government from generating evidence
about the reliability of latent print evidence, but may have actually discouraged the
government from generating it.
In the case of forensic evidence the situation is similar to that which obtained in
medicine at the time of EBM. That is, there are some "treatments" that had been used
for a long period of time on the assumption that they are effective without any evidence
that they are, in fact, effective. Similarly, there are some forensic techniques that the
103. 2001 WL 1735083.
104. 188 F. Supp. 2d at 576.
105. 365 F.3d 215, 240 (3d Cir. 2004).
106. Rose, No. K06-0545, slip op. at 22 (quoted from memorandum decision).
107. Id. at 31.
108. Rose, No. K06-0545, slip op. at 12 (quoted from memorandum decision re reconsideration). It is
interesting to note that, after the Rose court denied the government's Motion for Reconsideration, the
government indicted Rose in federal court. Brent Jones, Man Indicted by Federal Grand Jury in 2006 Killing
at Mall, Bait. Sun, (Apr. 2, 2008). The State's Attorney explicitly stated that the exclusion of the latent print
evidence in state court was the reason for indicting in federal court. What is particularly interesting for our
purposes here about this exercise in forum shopping is the implicit suggestion that the government hopes that
the requirement that trial evidence be evidence-based, that apparently is adhered to in the Maryland courts, will
not extend to the federal courts. This leads to the rather surprising implication that the government hopes that
the admissibility threshold for expert evidence will be less stringent in federal court than in Maryland state
court.
109. Saks, supra n. 47, at 888.
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criminal justice system has been relying on for a long period of time on the assumption
that they are reliable without any actual evidence they are, in fact, reliable. As in the
case of medical treatments, we should expect that in some cases our assumptions have
been well founded, and in other cases they have not. The legal admissibility problem,
however, is easier to solve: Daubert demands evidence of reliability; it does not allow
for the assumption of reliability. This, I would suggest, is part of the explanation for the
vexing nature of admissibility challenges to forensic evidence. Many forensic
techniques, however accurate they may actually be, simply lack evidence concerning
their accuracy. In this situation, a strict reading of Daubert demands exclusion even of
evidence that may turn out to be highly accurate, until such time as evidence of its
accuracy is amassed.
The history of latent print admissibility challenges serves to illustrate the need for
conceptualizing Daubert inquiries as demands that evidence used in trials be "evidence-
based." If courts take seriously the notion that Daubert hearings are trials that demand
the production of evidence about the reliability of the evidence that parties propose to
use in the enveloping trials, perhaps the American legal system will move a step closer to
joining the "evidence-based society."
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